In the United States, Japan and the Euro Zone, FX interventions are institutionally decided by specific political authorities and implemented by central banks on their behalf. Bearing in mind that these specific political authorities and central banks might not necessarily pursue the same exchange rates objectives, the model proposed in this paper takes account explicitly of this institutional organisation to examine its effects on FX intervention activity. The empirical relevance of our theoretical model is assessed by developing a friction model on the Japanese experience between 1991 and 2004 which reveals how the magnitude of that country's FX interventions is the outcome of the Japanese Ministry of Finance's trade-off between attaining its own exchange rate target and one of the Bank of Japan's.
The paper is organized as follows: section two presents the theoretical model of interaction between political authorities and central banks, the econometric approach is presented in section three, the fourth section contains the results of the empirical procedure while section five concludes.
The interaction model

Institutional aspects
Political organisation
In many countries, the monetary policy stricto sensu is in the hands of central banks while FX interventions are controlled by specific political authorities that order central banks to implement actual transactions (currency purchasing or selling operations) on the FX market.
1 It is in particular the case in the United States where FX interventions are decided by the U.S. Treasury and implemented by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Fed).
2 It is also the case in Japan, where the Bank of Japan (BoJ) only executes the orders of the Japanese Ministry of Finance which controls FX interventions. 3 In the Euro Zone, agreements on the exchange rate system for the euro and general orientations of the FX policy are the responsibility of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN). 4 On this basis, interventions on the FX market are carried out by the European Central Bank (ECB) as the core of the European System of Central Banks. The statutes, however, impose a strong constraint on FX policy decisions as they should be fully consistent with the general stance of the ECB's monetary policy and in particular with the price stability objective.
5 So far, all ECB's interventions have been carried out outside any agreement or general orientation from the ECOFIN as these «would only be drawn up under exceptional circumstances» as indicated by the European Council itself (Scheller, 2004) . Nevertheless, the European institutional framework is similar to that of the United States and Japan.
An essential characteristic of the institutional structure described along the preceding lines is that the Ministry and the central bank do not necessarily have the same exchange rate targets elaborated from their respective objectives. For instance, the Ministry, for pure political and electoral arguments, may encourage export-oriented activities to boost economic growth. Objectives like these may be achieved by favoring the depreciation of the domestic currency. The central bank, on the other hand, consistently with the dynamic of economic fundamentals, may pursue aims more in line with the general stance of its monetary policy and the necessity of ensuring the long term stability of prices. Obviously, such a policy would be inconsistent with an excessive depreciation of the domestic currency. It clearly appears, then, that exchange rate targets of the Ministry and the central bank may be different, mainly because their objectives are elaborated over different time horizons.
The political organisation underlying the FX intervention activity just described involves two institutions that are obviously concerned with exchange rate issues. However, only the Ministry of Finance has the ultimate power of deciding corrective measures on the FX market. As exchange rate targets of these institutions may not be consistent, the critical question is whether or not the Ministry, as the decision-taking institution, takes the central bank's objectives into account when elaborating its FX interventions. We discuss this point below.
Interactions
Several arguments justify that the Ministry of Finance is not indifferent to the central bank's objectives
giving, then, room for an analysis of their interactions. A first obvious reason is the gain in credibility that could be obtained by the Ministry if it could signal the market that its actions are backed by the central bank. Indeed, credibility may enhance the signal conveyed by an intervention improving, then, its effectiveness. It would certainly be hard for the Ministry to obtain that support if it acted without any consideration for the central bank's interests. Another justification is the eventuality for the Ministry to see the effects of its interventions weakened by the central bank if they adopt inconsistent measures leading to an ineffective policy mix. This may occur, for instance, when the Ministry tries to depreciate the domestic currency if, at the same time, the central bank adopts restrictive monetary measures. In this case, the underlying argument is the necessity of achieving a minimal level of policy coordination between the Ministry and the central bank to enhance the effectiveness of interventions. A last argument one may think of, while extreme, is the commitment of the Ministry to preserve the central bank's independence for the conduct of the monetary policy. Indeed, a too aggressive undervaluation policy may trigger inflation, that, eventually, will affect the central bank's policy if its main objective is to maintain stability of prices. From these elements, then, it seems safe to assume that the Ministry of Finance takes care of the central bank's objectives.
As long as the Ministry is actually concerned by the central bank's interests, the degree of compatibility between their exchange rate targets is another important factor that ultimately may influence general features of FX interventions and makes the definition of the optimal level of intervention far from trivial.
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Targets may be thought as being compatible if currencies purchases or sales reduce the deviation of the 6 See Appendix A for a graphical intuition on the question of targets compatibility.
exchange rate with respect to the Ministry's and the central bank's target simultaneously. Therefore, as an effective intervention not only will improve the Ministry's situation but also the central bank's, there is an additional incentive for the Ministry to intervene. This may lead to the elaboration of strong measures in order to maximize interventions effectiveness. Consistently with the signalling framework (Mussa, 1981) and the portfolio balance channel (see Edison, 1993 for a comprehensive description), strong measures may take the form of large, frequent, internationally coordinated and highly visible interventions (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Dominguez, 1998; Beine et al., 2002 . On the other hand, targets are incompatible if a purchase or sale of currency reduces the deviation of the exchange rate with respect to one of the targets and increases the deviation with respect to the other. In this case, the Ministry cannot improve its situation without damaging the central bank. In turn, it may be more reluctant to intervene or, at least, may try to minimize the impact of its FX operations by using small, infrequent and unilateral interventions to preserve the central bank. The incompatibility of objectives of the Ministry and the central bank may also trigger the use of secret interventions, as evoked by Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Chiu (2003) . In particular, Beine and Bernal (2006) empirically show that the use of secret interventions tend to be more frequent when interventions are designed to move the exchange rate away from the fundamental rate, consistently with the theoretical framework of Vitale (1999) .
In the following sections, we formally examine how the Ministry takes its intervention decisions and in particular how the amount of interventions is endogenously decided on as the outcome of its interactions with the central bank in a context where their exchange rate targets may be different and incompatible.
Interventions in an interaction framework
Loss functions
We elaborate an interaction model for an economy where interventions on the FX market are decided by the Ministry of Finance and just implemented by the central bank. That is, the central bank acting solely as Ministry's agent in the conduct of the FX policy. However, it remains completely independent to conduct the monetary policy. This is totally consistent with the framework described in the previous section. We consider that both the Ministry and the central bank will face losses if the exchange rate level (s t ) is deviated with respect to their exchange rate targets (respectively denoted by s that are known by both institutions.
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To take into account these elements, consistently with general models of interaction (see Brock and Durlauf, 2001) , our modelization strategy is based on the incorporation of the central bank's losses into the Ministry's total loss function and to minimize it under an exchange rate dynamic constraint.
To formalize this process we start from a traditional quadratic loss function for both the central bank 7 Note that all exchange rates are taken in log and indicate the domestic price of the foreign currency.
and the Ministry of Finance. Equations (1) and (2) respectively represent the central bank's and the Ministry of Finance's expected losses that depend upon Ω t−1 which is the information set available to both institutions and market participants at the end of date t − 1.
The central bank's loss increases more than proportionally with both positive and negative deviations of the exchange rate with respect to s 
Exchange rate dynamics
As in Ito and Yabu (2004) , we assume the authorities to believe that the exchange rate is driven by a random walk. If an intervention is decided at time t, it contemporaneously affects the exchange rate. The process is described by equation (3), where ϕ captures the impact of an intervention on the exchange rate and t is a white noise. I t > 0 (resp. I t < 0) is a domestic currency purchasing (resp. selling)
operation. An intervention of either sign will be effective if ϕ < 0.
Equation (3) supposes that the impact of an intervention on the exchange rate is proportional to the amount of the intervention. This is consistent with the portfolio balance approach but may not necessarily apply to the signalling framework. However, as the focus of our analysis is on how the size of 8 A justification for the symmetry of the central bank's loss function is the adoption by monetary authorities of an inflation targeting strategy (on this point, see Walsh, 2003 ). An excessive undervaluation (resp. overvaluation) of the domestic currency with respect to s cb t may, indeed, trigger inflation (resp. deflation) and justify corrective measures. 9 At first sight, that the Ministry cares about undervaluations as much as about overvaluations with respect to s mof t might be misleading if its objective is just to depreciate the domestic currency consistently with some political objectives. Nevertheless, this symmetry is justified by the fact that, by not controlling the depreciation of its currency, a country raises the risk of seeing the net benefits of the depreciation to be fully canceled by an increase of the price of imported goods. This is fully in line with the so-called Marshall-Lerner condition (for details, see Sarno and Taylor, 2002) .
an intervention is decided and not directly on the nature of the information transmitted to the market, the random walk specification is convenient. Other approaches to the exchange rate dynamic may have been considered. In particular, Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) use a GARCH specification to take into account the fact that interventions have an influence on both the exchange rate level and volatility.
Implementing this idea would require finding an appropriate measure of the volatility target. Baillie and Osterberg (1997) consider the average conditional variance as a potential candidate for such a measure.
Nevertheless, in our framework, as our focus is on differences existing between the Ministry and the central bank and, as it is not clear why they should have different volatility targets, we prefer to exclude the volatility issue. An alternative way of describing the exchange rate dynamic is proposed by Kearns and Rigobon (2004) who base their approach on a generalized version of the uncovered interest parity relation which is a convenient way to introduce expectations of market participants. Such a modelization complication is necessary to evaluate effectiveness of interventions which is beyond the scope of our work.
Optimal intervention
Minimizing losses constrained by the assumed exchange rate dynamic yields equation (4) which is the Ministry of Finance's reaction function where I * t is the optimal amount of intervention. An important feature of equation (4) is that it implicitly supposes that there are no costs related to interventions. I * t corresponds, then, to the shadow intervention level, that is, the level of intervention that would be decided on by the Ministry of Finance if it was not reluctant to intervene on a continuous basis. This, however, is not the case as actual interventions only occur if benefits of interventions are larger than related costs. While benefits associated to an intervention are basically the opportunity of correcting an inappropriate exchange rate dynamic, costs are of diverse types. They have been discussed
by Almekinders (1995) who broadly distinguishes pure bureaucratic costs (i.e. related to the decision process itself) and financial costs (i.e. related to the loss that could occur if a currency purchase (resp. sale) was not followed by an actual currency appreciation (resp. depreciation)). Credibility losses induced by an ineffective intervention may also been taken into account as the responsible authority may not be indifferent to loosing its credibility in the eyes of the market or its foreign counterparts for not being able to correct an undesirable currency dynamic.
Reluctancy of authorities to intervene is a stylized fact characterising the intervention activity on FX markets. Indeed, during the period 1985-1995, the U.S. and Germany respectively intervened on 7.5% 3 The econometric approach
A friction model of FX interventions
The linear econometric model implied by the optimal solution in equation (4) takes the form of equation (5) (4), β 0 is a constant and ν t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) is a random error term.
Equation (5) can be directly estimated by OLS (Ito, 2003) . However, because of the usual large proportion of days of no-intervention with respect to days where interventions were conducted, the estimation of equation (5) Friction models belong to the censored regressions models family. They were first introduced by Rosett (1959) who presented them as a generalisation of the two-limit tobit model. The particularity of these models is that they modelize a process characterized by a dependent variable only responding to large variations of the exogenous variables. 12 In other words, there is a mass point at particular limiting values of the exogenous variables that determine a no-effect band. For a discussion of the technical aspects of friction models see Maddala (1983) , while, a presentation of the economic relevance of these models to the study of FX interventions can be found in Neely (2005a,b) . Equation (6) constitutes the econometric model estimated in this paper by the maximum likelihood method. 13 I t , β 1 , β 2 , X t and Z t are defined as previously. Θ 1 < 0 and Θ 2 > 0 replace the constant of equation (5) and respectively correspond to the lower and upper limiting values determining the no-intervention band. Finally, η t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) is a random error term.
The friction model of equation (6) intervention band the width of which traduces the reluctancy of authorities to intervene arising from the existence of costs related to interventions.
The data
Interventions and daily exchange rate
The dependent variable of the friction model (denoted I t in equation (6) precise dates of interventions, currencies involved and transactions amounts) are publicly available from the Japanese Ministry of Finance website. 14 As shown in Table 1 , the Japanese case is particularly interesting because of the huge variability both in frequency and intensity of their intervention policy.
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Daily exchange rate measures used in this paper (denoted by s t in variables X t and Z t of equation (6)) were gathered from the U.S. Federal Reserve website and are noon buying rates in New York. 16 The quotation time is convenient as it ensures that an intervention occurs after the record of the rate. The rate may, then, be safely used as a determinant of interventions as long as authorities operate during Japanese business hours which is consistent with the evidence provided by Dominguez (2004) .
Ministry of Finance target
Ito (2003) documented that all Japanese sales (resp. purchases) on the YEN/USD market were carried out below (resp. above) 125 yens per dollar from 1991 to March 2001. This rate is not simply the result of an empirical observation from Ito (2003) . By examining news reports obtained through the Factiva 14 http://www.mof.go.jp/english/e1c021.htm 15 E. Sakakibara was the Director General of the International Finance Bureau in charge of the exchange rate policy at the Japanese Ministry of Finance. He was known to have adopted a policy of sporadic and massive interventions and originated the structural break in the Japanese FX policy suggested by the data.
16 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Hist/ database, we found news emanating from both Japanese officials and market participants indicating that the level of 125 yens per dollar is crucial to understand the Japanese FX policy for the period of interest.
17 In 1991 and 1992, the yen was particularly weak against the dollar. This was a major concern for the G-7 countries that urged Japan to take measures to correct the situation and to push the yen at denotes the log of 125 yens per dollar and this target rate is assumed to be constant all over the period analyzed in this study.
Central bank target
Due to the liquidity trap and deflation characterising the Japanese economy in the last years, the price stability issue may not be the major concern of the Bank of Japan the main objective of which is certainly to stimulate the economy by letting prices rise. Then, the exchange rate level consistent with the BoJ's objectives may not be so different from the Ministry of Finance's as FX policy measures designed to depreciate the yen against the dollar may enhance economic growth by boosting exportation activities.
However, Fatum and Hutchinson (2004) (6). Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the fundamental YEN/USD rate between 1991 and 2004. It clearly followed an appreciating path. This is fully consistent with the overall increase of the Japanese real trade balance during that period. 
Data partition
Interestingly, as illustrated in Figure 1 to the fundamental equilibrium (Beine and Bernal, 2006 identify this as the major determinant of the use of secret interventions).
23 Therefore, to have a precise idea of the Ministry of Finance's behaviour in an interaction framework, along with estimations over the full period, we conducted separate estimations on 1991-1996 and 1997-2004 sub-periods respectively corresponding to a pre-deflation and a deflation episode for the Japanese economy.
Results
Maximum likelihood estimations of our model's independent variables (X t and Z t ), tolerance thresholds (Θ 1 and Θ 2 ) and standard deviation of the random error term (σ) are reported in Table 2 . 24 To accurately assess the empirical relevance of our model, we conducted separate estimations of a pre-deflation and a deflation episode respectively corresponding to sub-periods 1991-1996 and 1997-2004 (1), (3) and (5) correspond to the estimation of a reaction function without interactions. These are introduced in specifications (2), (4) and (6). 25 Finally, the estimated value of the structural parameters of the model and some diagnostic statistics are provided at the bottom of the table.
Estimates of the model with interactions reported in (2), (4) and (6) and Θ 2 , are highly significant for all specifications. They determine the no-intervention band traducing the authorities reluctancy to intervene because of interventions related costs (Almekinders, 1995) . Furthermore, |Θ 1 | > |Θ 2 | indicates that currency selling operations of Japanese authorities involved larger amounts than their yen purchasing operations. On the whole, our results are also characterized by a high level of significance of variables X t and Z t respectively indicating that the Japanese Ministry of Finance indeed reacts to deviations of the exchange rate with respect to its own and BoJ's targets. 26 The full sample estimation reported in specification (6) suggests that deviations with respect to the Ministry of Finance's target are fought (i.e. the coefficient of X t is positive), while, deviations with respect to the 23 The massive use of secret interventions by Japanese authorities in the last years documented by Beine and Lecourt (2004) and Beine and Bernal (2006) (i.e. about 80% of official interventions between 2003 and 2004 were secret) raises the general question of how transparent is the Japanese exchange rate policy. This important point is addressed by Gnabo and Lecourt (2005) who analyse different concepts of transparency by defining appropriate indexes. Interestingly, their statistics robustly show a dramatic decrease of the transparency in the early 2003 for Japan. 24 We conducted an ADF and a KPSS test on variables It, Xt and Zt. While the first is clearly stationary, the last two are not. In a linear model, this would eventually cause inference troubles. However, given the non-linear structure of the friction model the potential problems, if any, caused by the non-stationarity are not so clear. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there exits no particular analysis of this issue for friction models. Solving this technical point is beyond the scope of this paper and we left it for a future work.
25 OLS estimates of the linear model described by equation (5) were used as trivial starting values for the maximum likelihood process. These results are not reported here for the sake of brevity.
26 The sign of Xt and Zt coefficients is consistent with the OLS estimates, however, their magnitude is larger as OLS estimates are biased toward zero. Note: Estimations were conducted over two sub-periods respectively corresponding to a pre-deflation episode («1991-1996») and a deflation episode («1997-2004») according to the Japanese consumer price index evolution. The Chow-type test proposed by Greene (2000) supports the data partition. Results for the whole sample are also provided («1991-2004»). (1), (3) and (5) are the estimates of the friction model without interactions. These are introduced in (2), (4) and (6). α < 0 means that the estimated value of the parameter is negative meaning that the Ministry's losses decrease when the central bank's losses increase, a situation that may arise if targets are incompatible. This is equivalent to the economic assumption of perfect indifference of the Ministry to the central bank's interests (i.e. α = 0). Standard errors are reported between brackets and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The estimation were obtained using Eric Dubois' GROCER (c) econometric package for SCILAB (c) INRIA-ENPC (a powerful, free and open source matrix-oriented software).
equilibrium rate are encouraged (i.e. the coefficient of Z t is negative). These results are in line with a policy designed to maintain the yen depreciated with respect to the fundamental rate at a level of about 125 yens per dollar (consistently with Ito, 2003) . Nevertheless, this supposes α = 0, which is in contradiction with the intuition of the interaction model that the Ministry of Finance internalizes central bank's losses.
27 However, these results should be considered with great caution as the Chow-type test proposed by Greene (2000) suggests that the sample partitionment into a pre-deflation and a deflation episode is relevant. We examine this point in specifications (2) and (4).
Specification (2) suggested by the conjuncture of the Japanese economy at that particular time, is the priority given by the Ministry of Finance to stimulate the domestic economic activity through a weak yen policy.
27 Mathematically, the estimated value of α is negative, which indicates that the Ministry's losses decrease with central bank's losses increases. This may arise when targets are incompatible as the Ministry cannot improve its situation without damaging the central bank. In our case, it is economically equivalent to assume the Ministry's perfect indifference to the central bank's interests, that is, α = 0.
In many countries, the FX intervention policy is in the hands of a particular political authority (i.e. the Ministry of Finance). Whereas the central bank solely plays the role of agent by implementing transactions orders in the FX market, it remains, however, totally independent to conduct the monetary policy. In this paper we describe a theoretical model of interaction between the Ministry of Finance and the central bank whose exchange rate objectives are not necessarily the same. While the Ministry of Finance's policy is supposed to be related to the short run objective of stimulating the economy by artificially depreciating the domestic currency, the central bank's objectives are thought to be more in line with the long term necessity of achieving stability of prices according to the general stance of its monetary policy. Our theoretical framework supposes that as long as the Ministry of Finance is not indifferent to the central bank's objectives and when they can be conciliated, there is an additional incentive for the Ministry of Finance to adopt corrective measures. On the other hand, if these objectives cannot be conciliated, the Ministry will be more reluctant to intervene given that its policy will be the outcome of a trade-off between the achievement of its own and the central bank's objectives.
To investigate the empirical relevance of the interaction framework, we define a friction model of intervention using the Japanese experience on the YEN/USD market for the period between 1991 and 2004.
The Japanese Ministry of Finance's exchange rate target is assumed to be 125 yens per dollar (consistently to the observation of Ito, 2003) and the Bank of Japan's target is supposed to be the fundamental exchange rate equilibrium. We identify two sub-periods of interventions respectively corresponding to a pre-deflation (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) and a deflation episode (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . Results on the first sub-period support the intuition of the Ministry of Finance internalizing central bank's losses and adapting its actions in accordance. On the other hand, estimations on the second episode do not confirm that behaviour. Instead, the Ministry of Finance's policy is clearly oriented toward aggressively depreciating the yen with respect to the fundamental rate to stimulate the economic activity, supporting, then, the explanation of Beine and Bernal (2006) on the use of secret interventions at that time.
The model of interactions analysed in this work is limited to the case of domestic agencies (i.e. the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan). This approach could be extended to incorporate interactions with foreign counterparts. While the exercise is theoretically obvious, empirically it is not.
Determining appropriate exchange rate targets for each involved institution may not be possible, at least with currently available data. Nevertheless, this clearly consitutes an interesting topic for further research. B Graphical illustration of a friction model Figure 3 illustrates the process modelized by the friction model estimated in this paper. The dependent variable only reacts to large changes of the independent variables. That is, actual interventions (I t ) will occur only if the shadow intervention (I * t ) reaches the limiting values Θ 1 and Θ 2 that define the no-intervention band. Economically, that means that actual interventions will occur only if benefits of intervening (e.g. the correction brought to the exchange rate dynamic) are larger than related costs (e.g. the bureaucratic cost of the decision process). 
A Compatibility and incompatibility of targets
C Likelihood function of the friction model
Equation (7) is the likelihood function of the friction model estimated in this paper. For a very clear introduction to the technical aspects related to the estimation of friction models, see Maddala (1983) and Neely (2005a,b) . Θ = (Θ 1 Θ 2 ) corresponds to the matrix of negative and positive thresholds defining the no-effect band, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, y is the dependent variable vector, x is the independent variables matrix, φ is the standard normal distribution density function, Φ is the standard normal distribution cumulative function and σ is the standard deviation of the random error term.
L(Θ, β, σ|y, x) = 
D News reports sample
The sample of news reported in Table 3 were obtained using the Factiva database. The research was conducted using «Bank of Japan», «Ministry of Finance», «Finance Minister», «yen», «dollar», «target» and «objective» as keywords for every trading day between April 1991 to March 2004. They clearly illustrate the crucial role played by the 125 yen per dollar rate to understand the Japanese intervention strategy during the period of interest from the perspective of both the Japanese authorities and market participants. 
